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J i l 'KiSDl lJ iON 
Pursuant to section 78-2a-3(i) of the Utah Code., this Court has jurisdiction of this case 
which is an appeal of a domestic 1 el;o<«? ? • . i • • - 1. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
i . /-\fc tiic u i a i t • ':< ''•'*" •<>* l i \,--. . . . . u - r 
evidence before it clearly erroneous am: u UL ir ihai ihe\ an unsupported K evidence in the 
• '
 ;
 i : . ;,. ..ai.« a. assets of the 
Parties ' 
n a i i d a i u Vi K C M C W : 
(a) M[T]he findings must embody sufficient detail and include jnougii ..ui i...ai -
to clearly show the evidence upon which they are grounded. Woodward v. Fazzio, 8^J i ' iuT/-r, 
477 (Utah App. 1991); 
(b) "[W]e reverse a trial court's finding of fact only if, after marshaling all relevant 
e vidence from the record, the appellant demonstrates that the finding was clearly erroneous, Fife 
v Fife, 111 P.2d 512 (Utah App," 1989); 
jUT standard of review in divorce proceedings allows us to disturb the action of 
the trial court onh \vhen the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or the trial court has 
abused its discretion '••» misapplied principles of law, Wiese v Wiese, (Utah 1985); 
. - *..;,, .;u .nuiiiui v'Maie demonstrate a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion? 
Standard of Review: "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony 
and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated, Howell v Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative provisions <li.il i IM'IH'I uttc • »•!!•. <»•?!<.• of (his «lt;jse. 
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i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE , 
Clyde Kay Cummings and Oletta Cummings were married for approximately 40 years. 
Mrs. Cummings initiated these divorce proceedings in August 1992. A Decree of Divorce was 
entered April 7, 1995 an Appeal was taken before this Court Case No. 950504. In decision 
rendered December 19,1996 this Court remanded the case to the trial court for further findings. 
The trial court determined to hold a trial on the issues remanded. Following trial the Court entered 
its Amended Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon remand, May 27, 1998. 
The principal focus of this case is the division of marital assets, including the business land 
and building. The division of assets between the parties was changed significantly by the trial 
court on remand. The trial court amended its previous findings. Instead of awarding all of the 
business building and land to plaintiff, the trial court awarded 75% of the building and land value 
to Mrs. Cummings and awarded 25% of the building and land value to Mr. Cummings. The trial 
court's division of marital assets was specifically expressed and intended to achieve a 50/50 
division of the marital estate. However, the court's division of property did not achieve its 
expressed purpose. The Court without any findings, facts, reasoning or explanation as to why the 
trial court deviated from a 50/50 division of marital assets awarded to Mrs. Cummings 66% of the 
marital assets and Mr. Cummings received 34% of the marital assets. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The genesis of this case began in late 1992 when Mrs. Cummings filed for divorce from 
her husband of thirty-eight years and attempted to take over the family business its property and 
156363-1 2 
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building. 
The original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed by the trial court on 
April 7, 1995. Issues concerning the division of assets were appealed by Mr. Cummings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its decision rendered December 19,1996, remanded the case 
for further findings as to the Court's valuation of certain assets. The trial court elected to have a 
trial as to those values and upon completion of trial entered its Amended Findings of Fact 
distributing the marital assets substantially different than was done in the original decree the 
substantial change in distribution was based upon the evidence addi iced at trial. In it's i Amended 
Finding of Fact the Court specifically expressed its intent to divide the marital assets equally 
betweei I the parties. The Coiii t n lade no findings as to why any divergence from an equal division 
of marital assets was equitable and proceeded to divide the marital assets 66% to Mrs. Cummings 
and 34% to Mr. Cummings. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
The trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Decree of Divorce, which materially and substantially altered and changed the distribution of 
marital assets. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
General Background 
1. Mrs. ("utiiiiitngs filol for separate iiiauilcnaiicc oi in I he alternative for divorce on 
September 1, 1992. (tr. 1 p.l) 
2. Mi and Mrs. Cummings were married on July 1,1954 and had seven children, all of 
156363-1 3 
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whom were emancipated adults at the time Mrs. Cummings filed for divorce. Complaint f 2 & 4. 
3. During the course of their marriage, the parties experienced irreconcilable differences 
which made the continuation of the marriage impossible. Complaint f 16. 
4. Mrs. Cummings' Complaint lists a general statement of her ex-husband's property, 
along with an estimate of its value. Complaint 120. 
5. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered April 7,1995, (tr. 4 p. 1295) 
which specifically provides as a Finding of Fact that the Court's intent was to divide the marital 
assets equally between the parties. The Court's language was to achieve a 50/50 division of 
marital assets. "37) With an eye to dividing the marital assets of ;the parties in a way which would 
allow the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly and equitable and 50/50 
division . . . " (tr. 4 p. 1308). 
6. The Court awarded the business to defendant (tr. 4 p. 1309) and the business land and 
building to plaintiff (tr. 4 p. 1308 and 1309) 
7. The decision of this Court on appeal was to remand this case for further findings 
concerning the valuation of the closely held business and any amendments to the distribution of 
marital assets that such reevaluation would require, (tr. 6 p. 2152-2153) 
8. The trial court elected to hold a trial on remand as to that evaluation of the business and 
the division of marital assets, (tr. 6. p. 2165) Upon completion of trial the Court entered its 
Amended Findings of Fact on May 27,1998, significantly and substantially changing the division 
of marital assets between the parties, (tr. 7 p. 2608) 
9. The trial court in its Amended Findings of Fact reiterated its express intent to divide the 
156363-1 4 
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marital assets equally between the parties on a 50/50 basis, (tr. 7 p. 2623) 
10. Without any findings, facts, reasoning or explanation the Court refused to divide the 
marital assets equally between the parties. The trial court awarded J\lis Cummings 66% of the 
marital assets and awarded Mr. Cummings 34% of the marital assets. (See Exhibit "A" 
Addendum) 
11. The inequitable distribution of marital assets is clearly shown on Addendi im "A" 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Addendum "A" references each paragraph 
of the Amended Findings of fact and the unequal division of mental ussels winch occurred, 
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT 
I his appeal is l.iktm to seek a determination that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to meet it's own stated purpose of dividing the marital assets equally between the parties 
and failing to provide any findings, facts, reasoning or explanation as to why an equal division of 
marital assets was not achieved. The case should be remanded for this court u > make MR II findings 
as to the reasons for not achieving an equal division of marital assets or to divide the marital assets 
in the equal division as intended by the coiit1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DIVIDE THE 
MARITAL ASSETS EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED 
IN FINDINGS OF FACT 
A Issue 
Whether it is reversible error when the trial court specifically stated that it would divide the 
marital estate 50/50 between the parties, but in fact divided the marital estate 66% to 34% without 
156363-1 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
1 
providing any findings, facts, reasoning or justification therefore. 
B. Analysis < 
i. Standard Of Review 
In divorce proceedings, the trial court is traditionally given considerable discretion in 
fashioning an equitable property distribution. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,1074 (Utah 1985); 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Absent an abuse of discretion, 
the court's findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear 
weight of evidence, or unless the court determines that a mistake has been made. Weston v. 
Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Rothe v. Rothe, 787 P.2d 534, 535-36 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In review of numerous divorce 
appeals a 66% to 34% distribution is not uncommon nor so outlandish to merit automatic review 
by an appeals court. 
To permit appellate review of the property distribution, the distribution must be based upon 
adequate factual findings and must be in accordance with the trial courts expressed intent and 
within the standards set by the state's appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The property 
division must be in accord with the courts expressed intent. Several court decisions have required 
that the failure to make findings on all material issues, constitutes reversible error "unless the facts 
in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment.'" Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 1?>1 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) {quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) 
1SMM-1 6 
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In addition, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts 
to reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented. Carlton v. 
Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1988); Acton, 131 P.2d at 999; Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). There is a significant lack of factual findings in the present case as to the 
disparity of the distribution of marital assets. The failure of the trial court to provide any Findings, 
reasoning, facts, explanation, or justification for the property division contrary to the court's own 
expressed intent is reversible error. 
ii. Findings 
Recent case law is clear that if the trial court failed to enter specific, detailed findings 
supporting its financial determinations, then the court abused its discretion. In cases tried in equity 
to the bench, the court is required to 'find the facts specially* and thus ground its decision on 
findings of fact which resolve the material factual uncertainties and are expressed in enough detail 
to enable a reviewing court to determine whether they are clearly erroneous." Erwin v. Erwin, 113 
P.2d 847, 848-49 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). "To ensure the court acted 
within its broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in 
appropriate findings and conclusions." Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988) 
(citations omitted); accord Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah App. 1991). These findings 
must be adequate to ensure on appeal "'that the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based.'" Painter, 752 P.2d at 909 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 
(Utah 1986)). Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In the present case this court stated, 
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With an eye to dividing the marital assets of the parties in a way which would allow 
the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly an equitable and 
50/50 division, the court finds a division of the marital assets should be as follows: 
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p 6 , tr. 7 p. 2623) 
Then the court proceeded to divide the marital assets 66% to Mrs. Cummings and 34% to 
Mr. Cummings. (See Addendum "A" attached hereto). The Amended Findings of Fact are 
completely void of any explanation as to why the trial court refused divide the marital estate 50/50 
as was expressly its intent. Defendant meets his burden as required in Moon v. Moon, 361 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15 (Jan. 22, 1999), see Exhibit A. 
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Alfred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108,1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah App. 1988)). See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App. 1992). 
Detailed findings are necessary to determine whether the trial court has exercised its discretion in a 
rational manner. When the Court fails to justify by detailed findings its deviation from its stated 
intent this Court must reverse and remand the case for entry of sufficient findings to support the 
Court's deviation from that expressed intention. Rehn v. Rehn, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 
Feb. 19,1999). 
Under Utah law, there is a presumption that the marital property will be divided equally. 
Therefore, when the court decided to divide the property 66% to 34% between the parties, as it did 
in this case, the trial court must be required to make findings of facts and provide some reasoning 
and justification for its ruling determining that its stated intent of a 50/50 division of assets as the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court specifically intended was not equitable or was not be realized in its distribution of marital 
assets. 
For example, in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the court observed that trial 
courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a fair, systematic fashion. See 
Id. at 1172 & n. 10. The trial court is required to categorize the parties' property as part of the 
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. The presumptive rule is that each 
party is entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. See 
M a t 1172. 
Later, in Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App., 1993), the appeals court held the absence 
of findings that would justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution is grounds 
for reversal: 
[T]he court's division of the estate cannot stand undisturbed when we are not 
presented with sufficient findings to demonstrate that the court's ruling comports 
with established law. The trial court made no findings as to any exceptional 
circumstances which took this case out of the presumptive rule of Burt... an 
unequal distribution of the parties' marital property makes no sense in the absence 
of findings justifying the decision, especially since appellee did not seek this result. 
. .Absent findings that would justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal 
distribution, we reverse and remand. 
Id., 858 P.2d 1018 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The only exception to this rule is where the facts in the record are so clear and 
uncontroverted that the trial court did not need to make any special findings. "Failure of the trial 
court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontro verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."' 
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 
156363-1 9 
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(Ut Ct. App. 1991). 
iii. Division of Property 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that there "is no fixed formula which a trial judge 
must follow in making a division of properties." Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975). It is the 
prerogative of the court to make whatever disposition of property it deems fair, equitable and 
necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties, See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 
(Utah 1977). However, the overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable—that 
property be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and 
their circumstances at the time of the divorce. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987). In the present case the trial court specifically stated its intent to divide the marital 
assets 50/50. 
The trial court is not without guidance in reaching an equitable division of marital property. 
The Utah courts have defined the factors for the trial court to consider in fashioning an equitable 
property division. The amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was 
acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the property; the health of the parties; the 
parties' standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the 
duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' ages at time of marriage and of 
divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133,135 (Utah 1987) (footnote omitted). The Courts are required to "follow the systematic 
approach set forth in BurC Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). That is, the court 
i^iAi- i 1A 
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should first "properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate 
property of one or the other. Each party is then presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id., 802 P.2d at 136. If the court then divided 
the marital estate in a division less then an equal division the court must justify such action by 
making findings of fact, which provide rational for the action taken. 
iv. Conclusion 
The trial court in this case failed to make any findings as to why a 50/50 division of marital 
assets would not be provided as the court failed to explain in any finding why a 66% to 34% 
division of marital assets was warranted or equitable. 
A trial court cannot make an uneven property distribution, which departs from its own 
expressed intent and the presumptive rule that marital assets are to be divided equally, without 
providing detailed findings and facts to disclose the steps that the court took to arrive at the 
ultimate decision of an unequal division of marital property. Otherwise, it is impossible for an 
appellate court to determine whether trial court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner. 
The remedy sought on appeal is to vacate the Amended Decree of Divorce and remand the 
case to the trial court with instructions to either divide the marital estate equally as stated was the 
express intent of the trial court or to provided a substantive set of findings and facts which would 
justify an unequal division of those marital assets. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FAILED TO 
PROVIDE ANY REASONING OR JUSTIFICATION FOR FAILING TO DIVIDE THE 
MARITAL ASSETS EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
This Court has noted that in divorce proceedings the trial court has considerable discretion 
156363-1 11 
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4 
in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 
(Utah App. 1987). However, an appellate court only grants deference to the trial court "when [its] 
findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision." 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah App. 1991); accord State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 
767, 771 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court decision afforded no deference when findings are 
inadequate). Therefore, for an appellate court "to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial 
supports the trial court's findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and include enough 
subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they are ground. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 
477 (citing Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant recognizes that he has the burden of marshaling the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrating to this Court that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the 
findings.1 Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477; accord Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.2d 917, 923 (Utah App. 
1989). However, if the trial court's findings are insufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary 
basis or factual basis for the court's decision, an appellate court will not grant the usual deference 
to the trial court's findings. Id. 
In the present case, there was a brief post-default evidentiary hearing. The court's findings 
must still be adequately supported and must "clearly show the evidence upon which the Findings 
are grounded." Id. Accordingly, unless the evidentiary hearing contains sufficient evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, they are inadequate and this Court need not grant any 
1
 To help meet this burden, Defendant has set out in Addendum "A" each of the court's findings and conclusions as to 
the division of marital assets and has cited to the evidence in the record, if any, supporting each specific finding. As 
even a cursory review of Addendum "A" reveals, many of the findings are unsupported by any evidence and the 
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deference to the trial court's ruling. 
Accordingly, the case should be remanded for the taking of further evidence, to be 
presented by both sides, regarding the valuation of the marital estate and sufficient findings as to 
why the expressed intent of the court to divide the marital assets equally was not followed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in failing to provide any findings, facts, reasoning or justification for 
its departure from its stated purpose of dividing the marital assets 50/50 between the parties. The 
Amended Decree of Divorce should be vacated and the case remanded for the trial court to enter 
such findings which justify the division of assets set forth in its Amended Findings of Fact or 
should take such evidence in trial to determine a 50/50 equal division of the marital assets as stated 
in its express intent. 
DATED this J2& — day of March, 1999. 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellant 
remaining findings are inadequately supported. Even based upon unsupported evidence the division of marital assets 
does not divide the marital estate 50/50 between the parties. 
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< 
ADDENDUM "A" 
ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
Amended 
Findings of 
Fact Paragraph 
-
21 
24 
25 
26 
27 & 36(e) 
36(b) 
36(c) 
36(a) 
37 
If tl 
Asset 
Home 
Paintings 
Stocks 
(additional taken from stocks 
temporary Order) 
1993 Oldsmobile 
Personal Property 
75%/25%ofland 
75%/25% of building 
Business 
Loan against the property 
Value 
127,000 
8,194 
227,918 
10,000 
25,000 
105,000 
692,748 
481,816 
Wife 
127,000 
8,194 
113,959 
10,000 
25,000 
25,000 
78,750 
519,561 
Husband 
113,959 
5,000 
26,250 
173,187 
481,816 
(260,000)z 
le land and the Building are divided equally: 1 
Overpaid Rent, rate of Decree through Oct., 1997 
Total of assets to each party 
46.500 
953.964 
(46.500) 
493.712 
The balance due at the date of original Decree of Divorce was $260,000. 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
156363-1 16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DAVID A. McPHIE (2216) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2105 East Murray-HoIIaday Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 Otip-j 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo-
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UPON REMAND 
Civil No. 92 490 3713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his 
Courtroom located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of March, 1995, at 
the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record, 
David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record, Earl 
Spafford. 
The court noted that the Default of the Defendant had been previously entered, and his 
answer stricken as part of the court's previous order signed on the 17th day of February, 1995. 
The Plaintiff testified concerning jurisdiction and grounds, and in support of the other 
allegations of her complaint, and in some detail, concerning substantive matters. 
This was done in an effort by the court, to provide the Defendant with a fair and equitable 
1 
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outcome in these divorce proceedings, even though he had only a limited right to participate in them, 
having previously had his answer stricken and his default entered. 
The court considered the testimony of the Plaintiff, and the testimony of the accountant 
Stephen F. Petersen. A Motion to publish all volumes of the depositions of C. Kay Cummings was 
granted. The Court considered the testimony of the Defendant as contained therein, and documents 
submitted to the court in connection with those proceedings, and as attached to the deposition. The 
Court having considered the file, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court published its original 
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and signed the original Decree of Divorce on the 7th day 
| of April, 1995. 
I The Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Court 
of Appeals remanded the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings on specific issues, 
on December 19,1996.1 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki upon remand 
from the Court of Appeals on the 11th day of August, 1997, and again on the 22nd day of 
September, 1997. At the hearing on remand, the parties were present, and were represented by their 
legal counsel of record, David A. McPhie attorney for the Plaintiff, and M. Byron Fisher attorney 
for the Defendant. 
The court received testimony and reports and exhibits from the court appointed expert 
witness David T. Posey. Plaintiff and Defendant examined the witness David Posey through 
counsel, and subsequently the Court published its Amended Findings concerning the fair market 
A copy of the Court's Order on Remand is attached to these Findings as Exhibit A. 
2 
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value of the business known as C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
This matter came on for further hearing on the 19th day of November, 1997, at the hour of 
1:30 o'clock p.m., where the court heard proffers of fact, and argument from counsel concerning the 
effect the Court's new Findings concerning the value of the business C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
should have on the overall distribution of property, and to consider the objections each party had 
filed to the other's proposed new Amended Findings. 
The Court having considered the arguments of counsel, and the proffers made, overruled the 
objections of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
ofLaw. 
The Court noted at the hearing on November 19, 1997, that it had previously, at the time of 
the original Decree, left open for further consideration the question, as to what the fair monthly 
rental or lease value of the building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, was. 
] The question of the fair monthly lease or rental value of the subject building came on for 
evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki on the 13th day of April, 1998, 
at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record 
David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record M. Byron 
Fisher. 
The Court, after having heard the testimony, the arguments of counsel, and having received 
the stipulation of the parties, and good cause therefore, made its Finding concerning the fair market 
3 
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lease value of said building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.2 
| Having now conducted all hearings necessary to, and in connection with the issues on 
remand, and those issues which were previously reserved for further hearing, the Court now, 
publishes the following: 
I AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON REMAND 
(1) The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 1 st day of July, 1954, 
in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
(2) The parties have been married continuously ever since, or for a period of forty (40) 
years. 
(3) The parties were both residents of Salt Lake County for the three month period 
immediately prior to the filing of this Divorce Complaint. 
(4) During the course of this marriage the parties had children born to them children. All 
of their children are now emancipated adults. Therefore the court need not make findings concerning 
custody, child support, visitation, or an Order to Withhold and Deliver. 
(5) The parties began a candy company which was known as C. Kay Cummings Candy 
in approximately 1965. The parties have operated that candy company since that date, and it has 
grown substantially in terms of physical size, and volume of business since then. 
(6) The Plaintiff, Oletta Cummings, played a major role over the years in the building 
A copy of the separate Findings and Order from that hearing is attached as Exhibit B. 
4 
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i of the candy company by both working there a great deal of the time and by taking care of the 
children at home and in taking care of the home. 
(7) The court finds that in 1984, the parties incorporated the candy company (which had 
previously been their partnership) and the company became known as C. Kay Cummings Candy, 
Incorporated. The court however, also finds that the parties have essentially run the corporation as 
though it were a partnership ever since its incorporation. The candy company has always been a 
closely held family business with family members and principally the parties holding all of the stock, 
and all of the executive positions in the corporation. The court further finds that the Defendant has 
had, and continues to have, total control of the business, regardless of its corporate form. 
(8) The court further finds that the parties have ignored corporate formalities to a large 
extent through the years. As one example, they have had few regular meetings of the board of 
directors. Only a few sets of minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors exist. Two of the sets 
of minutes were created by the Defendant subsequent to the commencement of this divorce action. 
; (9) The court finds that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is the alter ego of C. Kay 
Cummings personally. The court also finds however, that there is no advantage to either party, and 
it has not been requested by either party, that this court make an order concerning the legality, 
viability, or integrity of that corporation. The court does however, find that the it must make some 
decisions concerning the parties respective rights in the corporations assets, and that to protect the 
marital assets, the court must make some determinations as to the parties' respective offices and 
positions of control with regard to the corporation. Failure to do so on the court's part at this time 
would lead to allowing one party or the other, to eviscerate the court's proposed decree in this matter, 
and allow one party or the other to gain an unfair advantage or control over the other in post decree 
5 
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disagreements, which the court finds are likely to arise. 
(10) The court finds that Oletta Cummings served as a corporate officer in the corporation, 
and was only recently, and after the commencement of these divorce proceedings, removed as a 
corporate officer by the Defendant. The court further finds that the removal of Oletta Cummings as 
an officer and member of the board of said corporation was not with proper notice and violated other 
corporate law formalities. The court further finds that all appointments of others as officers and 
directors of C. Kay Cummings Candy to have been without proper notice to the Plaintiff and in 
violation of corporate law. 
(11) The court makes these findings for purposes of allowing the Plaintiff to protect her 
interests in the corporate assets which the court intends to give her as part of the Decree in this 
matter. The court further finds that should these steps be inadequate to give both parties equal power 
and authority over corporate assets further post Decree of Divorce steps may need to be taken. The 
court further finds that the parties are each one-half owners of all the stock of C. Kay Cummings 
Candy, Inc. 
(12) The court finds that the business, which originally was commenced by the parties in 
Sugar House, grew and that in approximately 1984, the parties purchased land located at 2057 East 
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The court further finds that the parties later, through an industrial 
revenue bond, obtained a loan and built a building on the land located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and that they subsequently moved the C. Kay Cummings Candy business into that 
building. 
(13) The court finds that the building, the land, and all the equipment, and assets, have 
been appraised by a court ordered appraiser, one David Posey, who is an accountant, who has relied 
6 
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on sub-appraisers as to the value of the real estate. The building has been appraised as being worth 
$587,748.00 and the land as being worth $105,000.00. The court further finds that these values are 
in some question but that neither party has objected thereto. On the other hand, the court finds that 
neither party agrees that $397,000.00 is the earning capacity of the business. This matter of the 
value of the business itself has been appealed by the Defendant and the question has been remanded 
to this court for further consideration. The court has elected to take evidence on the issue, and an 
evidentiary hearing was held on August 11,1997, and again on September 22, 1997. 
A. At said hearing, the Court received the testimony of the witness David Posey, 
a Certified Public Accountant, who was previously appointed by the Court to do an 
appraisal of the subject business. Mr. Posey was called and sworn. Mr. Posey was 
examined and cross examined by counsel at some length. Mr. Posey identified 
Defendant's exhibits 1,2, and 3, and the same were admitted in evidence. 
B. The court finds that David Posey is an independent Certified Public 
Accountant, and is not an employee of the Defendant, nor does the witness share any 
interest in the outcome of these proceedings. 
C. The Court finds that the evaluation of the business by the Court appointed 
expert included consideration of the value of any good will of the business. The 
Court also finds that the valuation given by David Posey is based on unaudited 
factual data reported to him by Mr. Cummings. The court further finds that the 
appraisal done by Mr. Posey was based on generally accepted business accounting 
practices used in evaluating businesses. 
D. The court finds that the value of the business without the building or the real 
7 
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estate at the time of the divorce, was $481,816.00. The court further finds that this 
amount takes into account previously taxed but undistributed income, and that 
paragraph #21 of its previous Findings should be deleted. 
(14) The court finds that the real estate on which the candy company building is built and 
where the business is transacted is in the name of the parties as joint tenants and always has been. 
The court further finds that the parties have leased that land to the business over the years, and that 
at one time they had a written lease agreement. Said land lease agreement provided that each of the 
parties would be paid $500.00 per month. The court further finds that in recent years, the parties 
have orally agreed to a land lease payment from the business to them personally at $1,500.00 each 
per month ($3,000.00 per month total). The court makes no finding as to what the fair lease value 
of the land and/or building to the business is, but finds that by the course of conduct, $1,500.00 each 
per month from C. Kay Cummings, Inc. to the Plaintiff and Defendant has become the agreement 
of the parties. 
(15) The court finds that during the course of the litigation in this case which extended 
originally over a period of approximately two and one-half years, (and by the time the Court heard 
the matter on remand nearly five years), the Defendant has totally controlled the business, C. Kay 
Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is currently 
behind in its land lease obligation to Oletta Cummings for the months of September 1992 through 
December 1992, January 1993 through December 1993, January 1994 through May 1994, and 
December 1994 through September 1995, for a total arrearage spanning twenty-four (24) months and 
a total arrearage in the amount of $36,000.00. 
(16) The court further finds that the Defendant was ordered to pay Oletta Cummings 
8 
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$ 1,663.00 per month as and for temporary alimony early in these proceedings. This has been the 
order of the court for a period of approximately two and one-half years. The court further finds that 
the Defendant has tried during the divorce proceedings to get credit against his monthly temporary 
alimony obligation by sending checks to the Plaintiff marked land lease payment, and not sending 
a separate alimony check to her in the $ 1,663.00 per month amount. The court further finds that the 
Plaintiff has obtained on two separate occasions judgments against the Defendant including 
attorney's fees arrearages in the alimony obligation and that the court on two prior occasions found 
that the temporary alimony obligation, and the land lease obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
are separate obligations, and that the Defendant is not entitled to credit for one against the other. 
(17) The court finds that the parties discussed the idea of a Family Trust in 1984 when 
candy business was incorporated. The court further finds that the notion of a family trust was 
referred to in some of the documents surrounding the financing of the building and that the parties 
signed a stock certificate at the time the business was incorporated which purported to transfer the 
stock of the corporation to a family trust. The court finds however, that no trust existed at the time 
of that transfer and that therefore the purported stock transfer was null and of no effect. The court 
further finds that at the time the stock transfer document was executed by the parties, it was 
anticipated that a subsequent family trust which was yet to be formed, would contain provisions 
jointly agreed on by the parties. The Court finds that there was no subsequent agreement or 
formation of a joint trust. The court further finds that the Defendant, by himself, subsequent to the 
incorporation and the document purporting the transfer of each of the parties corporate stock to a 
trust, created his own trust. The court finds that the Defendant could not or did not obtain the 
signature of his wife on that trust agreement. The court further finds that the Defendant then 
9 
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attempted to create a trust by himself by being the sole trustor and trustee. The court also finds that 
I although the Defendant had the power to create and fund a trust by himself, he did not by himself 
have the power to put his wife's share of marital assets into his own personal trust. 
(18) The court further finds that it must make findings with regard to the validity of the 
| purported Cummings Family Trust referred to immediately above in that the Defendant has, since 
j a relatively early time in these proceedings, maintained that a family trust exists, and that much of 
the marital property of the parties is in that trust, and that it is therefore outside the reach of the court. 
The court further finds that in the fall of 1993, while this divorce was pending, and after nine years 
of ignoring the claimed trust, the Defendant unilaterally and without notice to anyone, after nine 
years of being the sole "trustee" of the "trust," attempted appoint two co-trustees, had trust letterhead 
printed, and opened a trust account. All of these activities were the first interest shown by the 
Defendant in the trust that the Defendant in nine years time, and only after the divorce action was 
commenced. The court further finds that in the fall of 1993, when this divorce had been pending for 
approximately one year, the Defendant then had his purported newly appointed co-trustees file an 
action through separate counsel to try and intervene in this divorce action to protect the assets of the 
so called trust. The court notes that this matter of intervention was heard first by the court's 
commissioner for domestic matters, Michael S. Evans, and that pursuant to the rules concerning 
intervention, the Commissioner made a recommendation that the trustees not be allowed to 
intervene. That recommendation was appealed to this court and subsequently sustained. In so doing 
the court then found and now finds that the Defendant, as the original trustee, and a continuing 
"trustee" under the Defendant's alleged trust, could adequately represent the interest of the trust in 
the divorce litigation, reserving to the Defendant the right to call his alleged co-trustees, or other 
10 
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witnesses at the time of trial. The court further finds that the Defendant had no bank account of any 
kind for the trust for approximately nine years from 1984 to 1993. That there was no trust letterhead, 
and that no trust business was conducted. That the trust filed no tax returns until 1993 when the 
Defendant began to realize the weakness of his trust claim, at which time he opened trust account, 
had letterhead printed, and began to file trust returns. 
(19) The court further finds that the Defendant, established or attempted to establish another 
trust like entity in the late 1980fs or early 1990's, giving a new trustee, namely one Frank Pond 
I Reese, control over aspects and assets of the candy company, which the Defendant has claimed were 
transferred earlier into the 1984 trust. That the court finds this behavior is inconsistent with the 
notion that the 1984 trust ever existed, even in the mind of the Defendant. The court finds that no 
other non-business related, non-marital assets, were ever put into the "trust." The court finds that 
the Cummings Family Trust does not now exist, specifically that the trust that the Defendant 
purported to try and establish by himself in 1984 never existed, and that none of the assets of the 
candy company or the parties are now, or ever were, transferred from the control of the shareholders, 
or owners of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that each of the parties hereto 
each own one-half of the C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. stock and that they each own personally 
one-half of the land, building, and business located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which serves as the premises of the Candy Company. 
(20) The court further finds that each of the parties personally own one-half of all other 
assets of the C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. including investment accounts, bank accounts, motor 
vehicles, equipment, stock, materials, accounts receivable and contracts, and any other property of 
any description wheresoever situated located at the 33rd South location or at the foothill store. 
11 
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(21) The court finds that the parties acquired a home and real estate during the marriage 
located at 1134 E. Herbert Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is currently paid for. The court further 
finds that said home and real estate is worth approximately $127,000.00. Further, the court finds that 
said home was purchased by the parties from the Plaintiffs parents on favorable terms due to the 
relationship existing between the Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Plaintiffs parents. 
(22) The court further finds that the parties have been separated for more than two years, 
and that the Plaintiff has resided in the home since the date of the parties separation. The court finds 
[that the parties have largely divided between them the personal property that was located in the 
house in a manner which should be confirmed by the court, awarding to each of the parties those 
items of personal property currently in their possession as their sole and separate property, free and 
clear of any claim of the other party subject only to exceptions which are otherwise specified herein. 
(23) The court finds that the coin collection (silver coins) and the stamp collection, have 
values of $422.00 and $1,129.80, respectively and that these should be awarded to the Defendant 
who collected them. 
(24) The court finds that the art work (paintings) of the parties have a value of $8,194.00 
and should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
(25) The court finds that the parties should each be awarded one-half of all stocks, bonds, 
and other investments acquired during the course of the marriage by the parties or either of them 
currently held or administered by Smith Barney, or First Western Financial Advisors, or elsewhere 
regardless of the name the account may be in. These accounts currently have total market value of 
$237,918.00 and each of the parties should be awarded $118,959.00 worth. The court finds that the 
known investments may be described as and have the values as listed on Exhibit C attached hereto. 
12 
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(26) The court further finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1993 Oldsmobile as 
her sole and separate property free and clear of any claim of the Defendant. 
(27) The court further finds that each of the parties should be awarded approximately one-
half of all other personal property acquired during the course of the marriage not otherwise herein 
provided for. 
(28) The court finds that determining the Defendant's income is problematic. The 
business, C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., has had gross sales in 1992 and 1993 of $1,125,388.00 and 
$1,281,404.00 respectively. Although the Cummings personal tax returns show joint income of 
$151,064.00 and $205,760.00 for 1992 and 1993, the Defendant has chosen for the parties to live 
austerely, and has during the last two years of the divorce, while this divorce has been pending 
chosen to live in a small office at the candy store and to shower at a local gymnasium. In doing this, 
the Defendant has chosen for the parties, instead of taking income, to plow both parties share of the 
income back into the business as previously taxed and retained income as referred to in paragraph 
twenty-one above. 
I (29) The court finds that the Defendant's stated income at the time of deposition was 
unusually low. The court finds that this stated salary is artificially low, and is not reasonably or 
realistically connected to the amount of money that the Defendant could or would but for these 
divorce proceedings, be taking out of the business income. The court further finds that determining 
income for support purposes may be different than for IRS purposes {Utah Code Anno. §7-45-7.5). 
The court further finds that a reasonable amount to attribute to the Defendant as income, including 
a salary from the business without putting the cash flow and needs of the business at risk is $ 160,000 
per year or $13,330.00 per month gross. The court makes this finding based on the testimony of 
13 
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i Stephen F. Petersen who reviewed the tax returns of the business for 1992 and 1993, and the parties 
I for 1992 and 1993. 
(30) The court further finds that this finding in paragraph thirty immediately above is 
| unnecessarily difficult to make because the Defendant has refused to participate in the discovery 
process in ways and to an extent which is documented elsewhere in the file and which ultimately led 
I to his answer being stricken and his default entered. 
(31) The court further finds that the Defendant has provided little information over the two 
and one-half year span of this case concerning his expenses. What little information the court does 
have was provided early in the divorce process during a time when the Defendant was living at the 
candy store, apparently the Defendant has continued to live at the candy store during these divorce 
proceedings, obtaining his meals commercially, and showering at a local gymnasium. The court 
finds that the Defendant cannot reasonably continue to live at the candy store, buy all his meals 
commercially, and shower at a gymnasium, and that he will ultimately choose, post decree of 
divorce, to live under less than such austere circumstances, and with no other information available 
from him but his original declaration of expenses on file, that his monthly expenses are, or will 
reasonably be, $1,500.00 per month. 
(32) The court finds that the Plaintiff is employable but all her experience is at the candy 
company where she has developed experience in all phases of the candy business over a period of 
thirty plus years, the court finds that the Plaintiff at age sixty-four is not likely to be retrained in 
another field or find a job that will pay her more than near minimum wage. 
(33) The court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to both A^ 
payment for her one-half share of the real estate on which the business is located, and alimony in the 
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amount of $ 1,663.00 per month which has been the temporary order of the court for two and one-half 
years. In making this finding the court notes that both parties need for support has contracted to 
meet the money available based on the Defendant's unilateral decision to put the parties in an 
austerity mode during these divorce proceedings. That the Defendant has been under court order to 
pay $1,663.00 per month in alimony and under a contractual obligation to pay $1,500.00 per month 
additionally in land lease payments. The court further specifically finds that the $3,000.00 a month 
that the business has been paying for the land, ($1,500.00 to each party) is not the fair monthly lease 
or rental value of the land and building, and that the fair monthly lease value of the land and building 
as of April 13,1998, was the amount of $7,414.00 per month triple net, meaning with the lessee or 
tenant paying this amount plus all taxes and insurance on the building, etc. 
(34) The court further finds that the Plaintiff is unemployed She has historically had 
expenses of $1,663.00 per month during these proceedings. The court finds that it is difficult to set 
an appropriate alimony amount in this case because of the Defendant's failure to participate in the 
discovery process. The court notes that in making this alimony finding that the Defendant argued 
on more than one occasion that his temporary alimony obligation should be lowered but in each 
instance the temporary alimony of $1,663.00 was upheld. The Defendant, with some prodding, has 
paid this amount for two and one-half years. The court finds that Mrs. Cummings is entitled to 
receive, on a permanent basis, $ 1,663.00 per month as alimony and the income she will receive from j 
'the ownership of the land and building, which the court intends to award her as her one-half of share 
i 
of the marital assets. The court further finds that C. Kay Cummings can, and has had in the past, the 
1
 \ 
power to pay said alimony and to make sure that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. pays Oletta I 
Cummings a lease payment on the building and real estate, and that said lease payment should be 
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in an amount equal to 75% of the fair market lease value. The court finds the fair market lease value 
to be $7,414.00 per month. The Defendant should be ordered to pay or cause to be paid to the 
Plaintiff 75% of said fair market value per month, or the amount of $5,560.00, commencing on the 
1st day of May, 1998. 
(35) The court finds that the best thing for both parties would be to preserve the business, 
C. Kay Cummings Candy, as an ongoing concern operated by the Defendant. A sale of the business 
assets is not an attractive alternative because the income producing capacity and blue sky of the 
business is closely tied to the Defendant operating the business himself, and because of the specialty 
I nature of the business. 
(36) With an eye to dividing the marital assets of the parties in a way which would allow 
the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly an equitable and 50/50 division, the 
court finds a division of the marital assets should be awarded as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
a. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in align with the value; Value: $127,000.00 
b. A 75% interest in the ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which is the real estate on which the business building is located and the business is operated; 
Value: $78,750.00 
c. A 75% interest in the building located at 2057 East 3300 South on the above 
described land on which the business is located; 
Value: $440,811.00 
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d. One half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors investment accounts 
with values totaling $227,918.00, or $113,959.00 to her. 
e. All personal property currently located in the home and real estate at 1134 
Herbert Avenue, including the jewelry in the Defendant's possession (the collateral), with the 
I exception of the stamp collection and coin collection. 
Estimated value at the time of hearing: $25,000.00 
TOTAL TO PLAINTIFF $785,520.00 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
a. All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, and other personal 
property of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., including Blue Sky, the van, and the ongoing right to 
operate the business in the name of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. plus the previously taxed income 
retained by the business. 
| Business Value: (without real estate) $481,816.00 
b. All the Defendant's clothing and personal effects and personal property 
currently in his possession including the stamp and coin collections; but not the jewelry referred to 
above; Value: $ 5,000.00 
c. One half of Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and retirement 
accounts; Value: $113,959.00 
d. A 25% interest in the real estate and building located at 2057 East 3300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Value: $178,187.00 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TOTAL TO DEFENDANT: $778,962.00 
(37) The court further finds that the business C. Kay Cummings Candy has in addition to 
paying the $1,500.00 per month to each party as a land lease payment, been making the payment to 
Helen Rappaport and Alan S. Cohen for the financing on the land and/or building (which had a 
balance owing on March 17, 1998 or $321,684.00). The court finds that the Defendant should 
assume and pay debt on the land and building as his sole and separate debt, and hold the Plaintiff 
harmless thereon. 
(38) The court finds each of the parties should execute all documents needed to carry out 
the intent of these findings and decree based thereon 
(39) The court finds that the plaintiff has asked the court for and received from the court 
prior judgments for temporary attorney's fees, which have been paid by the Defendant. The court 
further finds that in addition to the fees which have been previously awarded and paid, the Plaintiff 
has reasonably incurred the sum of $2,920.00 in additional attorney's and paralegal fees, and $300.00 
in additional costs of court for professional witnesses who testified at the time of the default hearing, 
namely Stephen F. Petersen. 
Having published the above findings of fact the court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony previously existing between the parties. The same to become final upon the signing and 
entry thereof. 
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(2) The Decree of Divorce should adopt and be congruent with the Findings of Fact 
outlined above. I 
(3) The trust the Defendant attempted to create in 1984 does not now exist, never existed, | 
and was never funded with marital assets or otherwise. 
(4) Oletta Cummings is the Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors of 
C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., having never been removed from those offices. 
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